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ABSTRAK
Arus Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTF) memicu kekhawatiran dunia, termasuk negara-negara di Asia
Tenggara. Pada tahun 2017, Indonesia mengajukan inisiatif “Our Eyes” untuk menciptakan sebuah wadah
bagi negara-negara ASEAN untuk bertukar informasi intelijen guna memberantas kegiatan terorisme
transnasional. Inisiatif tersebut kemudian diubah menjadi “ASEAN Our Eyes” (AOE). Tetapi, beberapa
tahun setelah dibentuknya inisiatif tersebut, terjadi peristiwa pengeboman gereja di Jolo, Filipina. Inisiden
tersebut menunjukkan hambatan untuk mengimplementasikan inisiatif AOE. Pelaku diidentifikasi sebagai
Warga Negara Indonesia yang berhasil masuk ke Filipina berkat bantuan jaringan teroris lokal di Filipina.
Idealnya, inisiatif AOE dapat mencegah serangan tersebut. Artikel ini akan mendiskusikan dinamika
domestik di Indonesia dan Filipina mengingat pentingnya memahami dinamika lokal nasional sebelum
menilai efektivitas dari sebuah inisiatif di tingkat kawasan. Kajian ini menggunakan konsep resistansi
birokrasi untuk memahami karakeristik dari organisasi intelijen di kedua negara. Tulisan ini
mengidentifikasi potensi kebocoran informasi dan budaya patron-klien yang menghambat pertukaran
informasi intelijen antar organisasi intelijen. Sulit untuk mengharapkan terciptanya sebuah pusat data
intelijen terintegrasi di tingkat kawasan apabila proses pertukaran informasi tidak terjadi di tingkat
nasional atau lokal.

Kata kunci: Pertukaran Informasi Intelijen, ASEAN, Our Eyes, Resistensi Birokrasi, Politik Domestik

ABSTRACT
The flow of Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTF) sparks concerns around the world, including Southeast Asian
countries. In 2017, Indonesia proposed “Our Eyes” initiatives to create an intelligence-sharing platform
among Southeast Asian countries to stave off the transnational terrorism. This initiative was later adopted
as “ASEAN Our Eyes” (AOE). A few years later, however, the Jolo Church Bombing in the Philippines
demonstrated the impediments to implementing the initiative. The perpetrators were identified as
Indonesians who entered the Philippines through the assistance of local terrorist networks. Ideally, the
initiative could have prevented the attack. This article will discuss the domestic dynamics in Indonesia and
the Philippines since it is critical to understand the local dynamics in the region before assessing the
effectiveness of regional initiatives. This study employs the concept of bureaucratic resistance to
understand the nature of intelligence organisations in these two countries. It identifies the potential leakage
of information and the perennial problem of patron-clientelism that hinder the relevant intelligence
agencies in each country from sharing information with each other. We could not expect a well-integrated
intelligence database in the region if the intelligence sharing between local agencies do not exist.

Keywords: Intelligence Sharing, ASEAN, Our Eyes, Bureaucratic Resistance, Domestic Politics
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INTRODUCTION
The Jolo Church Bombing incident in 2019 raised doubt about counterterrorism
cooperation among ASEAN members. In January 2019, Indonesian couple Rullie Rian
Zeke and Ulfa Handayani Saleh detonated explosives at the Our Lady of Mount Carmel
Cathedral in Jolo, Sulu. Prior to their departure to the Philippines, the couple underwent
a rehabilitation program held by the Indonesian government for deportees.1 Detailed
information about their identities came to light following a series of arrests of members
of Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD), the umbrella organization of Islamic State (IS)
sympathizers in Indonesia.
Indonesia and the Philippines initially disputed the identity of the Jolo Church
Bombing’s perpetrators. The Philippines had an internal debate in confirming the identity
of the perpetrators. In the aftermath of Bombing, President Rodrigo Duterte was quick to
claim that the perpetrators were from Indonesia based on intelligence information
(Rappler, 2019). The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), however, asserted that
comprehensive investigations were required before releasing a conclusive statement (The
Philippines Star, 2019). The AFP did not deny the fact that President Duterte received
information from various intelligence agencies that led to that statement. Despite the
AFP‘s cautious statement, Philippine Interior Secretary Eduardo Ano was certain that the
Abu Sayyaf Group assisted the Indonesian couple in attacking the churches (The Jakarta
Post, 2019). Indonesian officials did not immediately confirm Ano’s statement as they
believed that further confirmations from the Philippines National Police (PNP) and the
AFP were required (The Jakarta Post, 2019).
This early development between Indonesia and the Philippines was ironic given
that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) released a new initiative, “Our
Eyes Initiative (OEI)” in January 2018. The defense pact is an intelligence sharing
cooperation to combat terrorism, radicalism, and extremism in the region. Defense senior
officials from each country were expected to hold regular meetings to exchange
intelligence information about the current condition in their respective countries (Reuters,
2018). Following the 5-month Marawi Siege in the Philippines, high ranking officials are
concerned about the flow of foreign fighters within the region since fighters from other
ASEAN countries joined the siege (Reuters, 2018).
Unfortunately, the Jolo Church Bombing demonstrated that intelligence sharing
remains a delicate issue. Moreover, the principle of non-interference among ASEAN
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countries creates perennial obstacles to forming a solid initiative. Different statements
from the Philippine authorities and security apparatus in the initial stages of the
investigation showed that there are more complex domestic politics that should be taken
into consideration when analysing a regional counterterrorism cooperation. Hence, this
article would like to discuss the complex interactions between domestic politics and
regional counterterrorism cooperation. This paper would like to address the following
question: What are the obstacles to implement ASEAN Our Eyes intelligence sharing? It
will use the case of Jolo Church Bombing 2019 as a case study and to analyse the domestic
dynamics in the Philippines and Indonesia that intelligence mishaps.
This paper will first discuss existing literatures on ASEAN counterterrorism
cooperation. Second, it will elaborate the concept of bureaucratic resistance as an
analytical framework for this research. Third, it will discuss the current developments of
Our Eyes Initiatives and the incident of Jolo Bombing 2019. Lastly, this study will attempt
to understand the challenge of implementing intelligence sharing by using the concept of
bureaucratic resistance and the case of Indonesia and the Philippines.

ASEAN Counterterrorism Cooperation
Following the 9/11 and Bali Bombings tragedies, there have been various studies on
ASEAN’s counterterrorism cooperation. Past studies have been skeptical about ASEAN’s
counterterrorism cooperation due to lack of concrete actions. ASEAN’s meeting and
platforms are seen merely as a talk-shop. These literatures identified, at least, three main
factors which hamper the effectiveness of ASEAN CT Cooperation; domestic dynamics;
the principle of non-interference; and the role of external actors (Singh, 2003; Chow,
2005; Tan & Ramakrishna, 2004; Emmers, 2009; Banloi, 2009; Tan & Nasu, 2016).
Under the domestic dynamics, scholars identified various challenges that influenced
ASEAN states’ responses, such as the socio-economic conditions, lack of coordination
among relevant institutions, and the shortage of necessary resources. The disparities of
socio-economic conditions among ASEAN countries shaped different approaches. In
weak countries, namely Indonesia and the Philippines, the corruption cases in security
agencies are rampant which undermine the countries’ CT efforts (Singh, 2003; Chow,
2005; Tan & Ramakrishna, 2004; Emmers, 2009). Meanwhile, Singapore as a developed
country has no major issues with its CT efforts and has been successful in curbing the
terrorist networks in its own land (Singh, 2003, p. 210-211). The role of external actors
also stimulated debates among ASEAN countries in which Muslim majority countries,
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namely Indonesia and Malaysia, were very cautious about the assistance of the United
States (Singh, 2003; Chow, 2005). There was a fear that the United States’ Global War
on Terror (GWOT) agenda would jeopardize the life of the Islamic community across the
world. Last but not the least, the principle of non-interference of ASEAN hinders ASEAN
efforts in intelligence sharing for fear of external actors’ meddling in their domestic
matters (Chow, 2005; Tan & Nasu, 2016).
The national dynamics and different responses among ASEAN member states
have become the main issue in the discussions about counterterrorism cooperation.
Despite the transnational nature of terrorism, the majority of ASEAN countries perceive
terrorism as a mere domestic issue, thus national solutions have been prioritized (Chow,
2005; Emmers, 2009). Each state also has different legal measures to cope with terrorist
threats. In the early stage of its reformation era, Indonesia had inadequate legal measures
and a weak security apparatus. In contrast, Malaysia and Singapore already had strong
legal measures under internal security acts which allowed security apparatus to take
preventive actions against terrorist networks (Singh, 2003; Tan & Ramakrishna, 2004;
Chow, 2005). Implementing an internal security act in Indonesia would be very sensitive
and could only undermine the powerbase of the ruling government due to past experiences
with the authoritarian regime. Meanwhile, in the Philippines, the issue of terrorism has
been mainly addressed with counterinsurgency approaches given that the terrorist
networks acquired specific areas and have been carrying out armed struggles against the
government. Complex interactions between the root cause of terrorism threats and
available counterterrorism policies have shaped different perceptions on how to deal with
the threats. Besides threat perceptions and domestic policies, the literatures also identified
interagency rivalries that hamper the implementation of counterterrorism policies. The
problem of sharing of intelligence information, unfortunately, does not only occur
between ASEAN countries, but also within each country itself. The tug of war between
the armed forces and police emerges as a common problem. At the regional level, ASEAN
also lacks the cross-institutional cooperation which could provide an effective chain of
cooperation between the police and armed forces in ASEAN (Borelli, 2017, p. 16).
Most literature also highlighted ASEAN countries’ cooperation under the subregional scheme. When the discussions among ASEAN members hit deadlock and
consensus could not be reached, ASEAN members states would seek an alternative
through bilateral or trilateral cooperation. One such remarkable trilateral cooperation was
the signing of the Agreement on Exchange and Establishment of Communication
189
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Procedures in May 2002 by Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia (Chow, 2005;
Emmers, 2009). Under this agreement, the signatories should share intelligence
information, enhance their border security, and participate in joint-training (Chow, 2005;
Emmers, 2009). In 2017, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia formed a trilateral
patrol cooperation to monitor the Sulu-Celebes Sea that has been a hotbed for
transnational crime and terrorist networks (Tan, 2018, p. 142). Although trilateral
cooperation is an alternative to expediting an agreement on a counterterrorism scheme,
this form of cooperation is not without loopholes and critics. Sharing of intelligence
information remains a sensitive issue and most countries are reluctant to share such
information (Banloi, 2009). Member states are not obliged to share the information. In
most cases, unless they are asked by other member states or their own national interests
are put at stake by an incident, they will not share the relevant information. The principle
of non-interference remains intact.
Despite

the

criticism

toward

ASEAN’s

counterterrorism

cooperation,

Ramakrishna and Tan (2004, p. 92) opted for a more balanced stance; “it deserves a more
balanced evaluation”. Ramakrishna and Tan highlighted the criticism about the
ineffectiveness of ASEAN’s intelligence pact. Yet, they argued that various arrests of
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) key leaders in Southeast Asia would not be possible without
intelligence cooperation among ASEAN member states (Tan & Ramakrishna, 2004, p.
92). Ramakrishna and Tan acknowledged the problem of acute interagency rivalry within
ASEAN countries and suggested capacity building and improvement of legal measures
to prevent unnecessary frictions or bureaucratic issues.
These literatures have been very useful in understanding the ASEAN CT
cooperation. However, the literatures were primarily crafted in the aftermath of 9/11 and
the Bali Bombings tragedies. It has been two decades since these tragedies occurred, but
similar issues still remain. What has gone wrong? Intrastate interagency rivalries have
arguably become a main topic of domestic dynamics that hampers the counterterrorism
efforts. However, there have been very limited discussions about the root causes of the
interagency rivalries themselves. Is it only a matter of sluggish economic growth that
leads to competition over resources? Are there any other reasons that lead to such
unhealthy competitions? This paper would like to fill in the gap in the existing literature
by answering these questions with the concept of bureaucratic resistance.

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
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Intelligence Sharing and Bureaucratic Resistance
In the aftermath of the 9/11 attack, there is an increasing need for intelligence sharing
between states. The nature of terrorist activities is no longer domestic, but transnational.
Each country should expand their intelligence cooperation to gain relevant information
about terrorist activities. There are limitations if countries rely only on their own
intelligence capabilities. Not even the United States could work on its own. The United
States’ intelligence agencies often encounter obstacles in gathering intelligence
information in other countries. They would need linguists and local experts who could
understand the landscape and characteristics of the local terrorist networks (Lefebvre,
2003, p. 528; Reveron, 2006, p. 454)
Unfortunately, intelligence sharing between countries is not an easy feat. The
nature of intelligence information as secretive information tends to hinder relevant
national and international agencies from sharing information with each other (Walsh,
2010, p. 12). Each country prefers to limit the flow of information and the receivers of
information; thus, the information will not be leaked to the targets or third parties or
adversaries (Walsh, 2010, p. 9). The uncertainty and fear of defections among the states
become a major obstacle in implementing intelligence cooperation. The intelligence
agencies will consider the cost and benefit of involving in an intelligence cooperation.
The intelligence community would like to protect their information and the source of
information itself. They do not want to risk leaking their undercover operations (Maras,
2017, p. 190).
The framework of bureaucratic resistance can be utilised to understand the
reluctance of the intelligence community to share information with each other. Fägersten
(2010) adopts the study of bureaucratic politics to understand the similar developments
among intelligence bodies. In general, the bureaucratic politics model explains that a state
cannot be seen as a single entity as there are various governmental bodies and each of
them have their own interests and perceptions on the notion of national interests (Allison
& Halperin, 1972, p. 43). Fägersten later adopts the concept of bureaucratic politics as
bureaucratic resistance whereby there are the notion of self-interests and the deeply
entrenched ideas within an organisation that hamper the intelligence sharing efforts. He
defines the two variables as; bureaucratic interests and bureaucratic culture (Fägersten,
2010, p 502). The idea of bureaucratic interests identifies the long-time investment and
assets of the agency. It takes a long time to build trust and establish a vast network who
can support the work of the organisation. Subsequently, the organisation will be reluctant
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to cooperate and share their own assets to the other organisations, national or
international. Cooperation with other organisations tends to look unattractive and will not
benefit the members of the organisations (Fägersten, 2010, p. 516). Meanwhile,
bureaucratic culture explains that an organisation will have shared ideas, expectations,
and long-established working practices. This specific culture defines how things work
inside an organisation. In the case of intelligence organisations, they have a very strict
and secretive working environment hence any changes to the established working flows
may undermine their long-established working environment. Fägersten argues that each
counterterrorism agency also has different organisation cultures and perspectives in
assessing the threats. For instance, an external-security oriented organisation would see
intelligence information as a means to alter the other’s policies to fit their own values and
goals. Whereas, an internal-security oriented organisation tends to see the intelligence
information as a source of power organisations (Fägersten, 2010, p. 517). In short, the
external-security oriented organisations are more willing to share the information to
influence the others’ views, while the internal-security oriented organisation tend to keep
the information to themselves because it is their bargaining power.

RESEARCH METHOD
This article will use the case study of Jolo Church Bombing 2019 to understand the
challenge of implementing the ASEAN Our Eyes (AOE). Case study approach attempts
to use an individual case to understand the general cases. This approach will allow us to
identify various intervening variables that lead to the hypothesis or explain a causal
relationship (George & Bennett, 2005). Jolo Church Bombing is a suitable case to identify
various factors that will create obstacles for the implementation of AOE. This incident
occurred after the initiative was adopted by ASEAN and involved two countries which
are identified as the hotbed of terrorist networks in the region; Indonesia and the
Philippines. The case also demonstrates the complexities of domestic dynamics in each
country that would be valuable to understand the impact of domestic politics to the region.
It will assess the domestic dynamics by using the concept of bureaucratic resistance. The
two variables that will be used to analyse the dynamics are; bureaucratic interests and
bureaucratic culture. Nevertheless, the author acknowledges that the case study approach
is also prone to case selection bias whereby a case is selected for the sake of confirming
the desired outcome (George & Bennett, 2005). This research will attempt to verify the
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information by examining various sources, such as academic articles, newspapers,
interviews with government officials, and official governmental documents or statements.

DISCUSSION
ASEAN Our Eyes
The Marawi Siege has alarmed the region about the flow of Foreign Terrorist Fighters
(FTF). Retired Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu, the Indonesian Defense Minister (2014-2019),
expressed his concern about it and highlighted an urgent need for the sharing of
intelligence information among ASEAN countries. Ryacudu proposed the “Our Eyes
Initiative” which was modelled after the Five Eyes alliance, an intelligence alliance
consisting of the United States, Great Britain, New Zealand, Australia, and Canada. The
initiative would serve as a multilateral intelligence sharing platform between six ASEAN
countries; Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam, Singapore, and the
Philippines (The Straits Times, 2017). Ryacudu acknowledged the lack of an integrated
intelligence sharing platform in Southeast Asia. Intelligence cooperation among ASEAN
member states is primarily bilateral or trilateral due to the complex nature of the region.
Hence, Ryacudu aspired to establish an integrated multilateral intelligence platform
where the member states hold regular meetings to maintain their communications and
create an integrated real time database (Ryacudu, 2020). Under this initiative, the Ministry
of Defense from each country would become the point of contact and responsible for
producing analysis based on the intelligence information that they gather from the
intelligence bodies in their countries (Adityawarman, 2019). Our Eyes Initiative was
formally adopted at the 12th ASEAN Defense Ministerial Meeting (ADMM) in Singapore
in October 2018.
This initiative was later adopted as “ASEAN Our Eyes” (AOE) in 2019. It is no
longer an initiative which comprises only a few of ASEAN member states. All states
agreed to adopt it as one of ASEAN’s intelligence frameworks and join it. AOE ideally
would provide preventive measures and early warning detection systems for terrorism,
radicalization, and extremism in the region. Ryacudu, the founding father of this
initiative, writes in his book that there are a few of issues which AOE aims to focus on;
terrorism financing, the return of Foreign Terrorist Fighters, propaganda on social media
and other sources (Ryacudu, 2020, p. 174). AOE has held, at least, six working group
meetings. During the working group meetings, the member states have formed the Terms
of References (TOR) and Standard Operating Procedures (SOP). AOE aspired to form
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Our Eyes Command Centre (OECC) that will assess the collected information and later
will be reported to the Ministry of Defence (Ryacudu, 2020, p. 173). Based on the TOR,
once the information is deemed urgent to be discussed in a strategic meeting, AOE will
utilize the ASEAN Direct Communication Infrastructure (ADI) as its communication
platforms and other relevant platforms to support its program. ADI was established to
provide a secure communications hotline between the ASEAN member states. It is also a
part of confidence building measures among member states to stave off tensions and
misunderstanding during a crisis (Kyodo News, 2021). Upon the collection of
information, the outcomes of AOE are subjected to review and endorsement of the
ASEAN Defense Senior Official’s Meeting Working Group (ADSOM WG) and
ADSOM.

No.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Table 1. ASEAN Our Eyes Working Group Meetings Schedule
Meeting
Place
Date
The First Working Group Meeting
Jakarta, Indonesia
29-30 October 2018
The Second Working Group Meeting Semarang, Indonesia
22-25 January 2019
The Third Working Group Meeting
Palembang, Indonesia 4-5 March 2020
The Fourth Working Group Meeting Video Conference
11 August 2020
The Fifth Working Group Meeting
Video Conference
4-5 May 2021
The Sixth Working Group Meeting
Video Conference
10-11 January 2022
Source: ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) Website (2022)
https://admm.asean.org/index.php/events.html

The Indonesian government as the proponent of AOE has been at the forefront in
forming the systems under AOE. When it was first established, OECC operated in the
Indonesian Ministry of Defence had collected intelligence information and analysed them
(Ryacudu, 2020, p. 173). The Indonesian government also invited experts from Australia
to create the Our Eyes Intelligence Management System (OE-IMS) to process a large
amount of data on the extremist activities in the region. The use of this centralized system
also aims to gather relevant actors from each country to understand the working system
of the platform and to encourage them to learn about the importance of intelligence
sharing (Ryacudu, 2020, p. 176). Regardless of its good intention, the establishment of
AOE is not without opposition within Indonesia. The initiative came from the Ministry
of Defence, hence the other relevant counterterrorism agency voiced out their oppositions
against this initiative. According to a government official from the National
Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT), it is not necessary to establish AOE given that
ASEAN already has other relevant platforms to share information between the member
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states, such as ADMM. They also scrutinize the purpose of AOE due to its nature as an
“intelligence gathering platform”, yet it only shares information related to terrorism or
extremism.2 Despite the oppositions, Ryacudu mentions in his book that AOE will not
limit itself to the information on terrorism or extremism. It may expand its scope to
maritime security related information (Ryacudu, 2020). However, the plan to expand to
maritime security could also lead to political ramifications because there are already
relevant bodies for the issue, such as the Indonesia Marine Police (Polair) and the
Indonesian Maritime Security Agency (BAKAMLA). The absence of division of labour
would only exacerbate the overlapping responsibilities between relevant agencies.

The Jolo Church Bombing
The defeat of the Islamic State (IS) and the Covid-19 pandemic have created obstacles
for aspiring jihadis to emigrate to Syria. The Philippines is believed to be the next
epicentre for some jihadis who remain committed to fighting.3 Historically, the
Philippines has always been the battlefield and training ground for jihadis in the region.
In the past, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)’s – the mastermind behind Bali Bombings - members
from other countries, mainly Indonesia and Malaysia, also underwent training in
Mindanao, Southern Philippines. During the Battle of Marawi, the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) identified Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTF) who joined the local
jihadis. AFP could not provide exact figures on the number of FTF, but it recorded at least
32 foreign militants were killed during the battle and some of them were minors (Yusa,
2018). In the aftermath of the Battle of Marawi, FTF remained active in the Philippines.
The 2019 Jolo Church Bombings demonstrated the active role of FTF in launching attacks
in the Philippines. In January 2019, Indonesian couple Rullie Rian Zeke and Ulfa
Handayani Saleh detonated explosives at the Our Lady of Mount Carmel Cathedral in
Jolo, Sulu. Prior to their departure to the Philippines, the couple underwent a short
rehabilitation program held by the Indonesian government for deportees. The
rehabilitation was only a month, then the deportees were repatriated to their respective
hometown (Anindya, 2019, p. 225). Although the deportees should have been under the
radar of the Indonesian government upon their release from the rehabilitation programme,
some of them managed to evade surveillance and moved to other regions.
Detailed information about the couple's identities came to light following a series
of arrests of members of Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD), the umbrella organization of
Islamic State (IS) sympathizers in Indonesia. It was believed that the couple were
195

Chaula Rininta Anindya

influenced by Khalid Abu Bakar, a fellow deportee who played the role of an ideologue,
to fight in the Philippines if emigrating to Syria was not feasible. The couple entered the
Philippines at the end of 2018 through Sabah and met their point of contact from the Abu
Sayyaf Group (ASG). They were prepared to carry out suicide bombings but had no
specific targets as ASG would be in charge of identifying the targets (The Straits Times,
2021). In October 2020, the Philippines security apparatus arrested two Indonesian
women who were allegedly plotting suicide bombings (Philippines News Agency, 2020).
One of them was identified as Rezky Fantasia alias Cici, the daughter of Rullie and Ulfa.
Rezky was married to Andi Baso, an Indonesian fugitive who died in an encounter with
the Philippines security apparatus in Sulu (Rappler, 2020).
The investigation on the identity of Jolo Church Bombing demonstrated the
uncoordinated domestic intelligence networks. The Philippines’ President Duterte and
Interior Secretary Ano’s were quick to claim that the perpetrators were an Indonesian
couple. Duterte and Ano’s statements enraged the Indonesian authorities as
comprehensive investigations had yet to be done by the time the two Philippines’ higher
authorities released the statements. The Indonesian Embassy in Manila contacted the
Philippines’ National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA) to enquire about Ano’s
statement and the source of information. Ironically, NICA stated that the agency had no
idea about the basis of Ano’s statement, and they would seek for clarification (Tempo,
2019). AFP was also hesitant to release any statements because they were still waiting for
the final investigation. The coordination between Indonesia and the Philippines only
occurred after the incident. AFP claimed that they shared important notes and information
to the Indonesian National Police (Polri) which led to the confirmation from the
Indonesian authorities that the couple are indeed Indonesian (Philippines News Agency,
2019). Such incidents could have been prevented if the sharing of information were done
regularly. Unfortunately, the relevant authorities only coordinated when an incident
happened.
The case of Rullie and Ulfa demonstrated the loopholes of intelligence sharing
within Indonesia, Philippines, and between ASEAN Countries. The couple were
deportees, they should have been under the strict surveillance of the Indonesian security
apparatus. However, they managed to cross the border via Malaysia before joining the
ASG. On the Philippines side, government officials and security apparatus did not release
the same official statements in the aftermath of attacks. These dynamics show that there
is a bigger problem that should be examined in understanding the challenges of
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intelligence sharing between ASEAN countries. It is not only the problem of coordination
between countries, but also within a country itself. Without solid cooperation between
agencies in a country, it would be difficult to expect smooth information sharing between
countries.

Bureaucratic Resistance of Indonesia and Philippines Agencies
Bureaucratic Interests
According to Fägersten, bureaucratic interests indicate the asset or investment that the
organisation has built for a long time, such as networks, knowledge, and personal
relationships. Each organisation has an established way of doing business and their
personal network has helped them to gather information from relevant sources. To
understand the dynamics during the Jolo Bombing incident, we should also trace back the
past intelligence mishaps that involved relevant agencies in Indonesia and Philippines.
Hence, we could analyse the characteristics of those agencies and understand why both
countries failed to prevent the Jolo Bombing and analyse the future trend in implementing
ASEAN Our Eyes. Indonesia and the Philippines are infamous for the patronage system
in the organisation.
In the Philippines, the distrust between PNP and AFP often led to deadly incidents
in the hunt of terrorist networks. Both PNP and AFP tend to withhold information for fear
of the leakage of information to the adversaries. A notable case was the death of 44 PNP
Special Action Forces (PNP-SAF) in the Operation Plan (Oplan) Exodus in 2015. Oplan
Exodus was a special operation to hunt down Marwan, a leader of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI).
SAF briefed President Benigno Aquino about the plan who later instructed SAF to
coordinate with AFP. Despite the order from the President, the Director of SAF (DSAF)
Gutello Napenas did not communicate with AFP and only shared the information to SAF
and some PNP executives (Villareal Jr., 2016, p. 32). The AFP was informed on the time
of the operation itself. Subsequently, they were too late to provide the necessary artillery
support when it was needed (Villareal Jr., 2016, p. 28). Napenas argued that sharing
information with AFP would only jeopardize the operation because they would leak the
information to Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Napenas suspected that the past
failures of the operation against Marwan was due to the operational security leaks within
the AFP (Villareal Jr., 2016, p. 32). Hence, he was unwilling to share all the information
that SAF had collected to hunt down Marwan.

197

Chaula Rininta Anindya

In a similar vein, the relevant agencies in Indonesia were also reluctant to share
information with each other as they believe that it tends to undermine their efforts. The
fear of leakage of information hinders the agencies from sharing information with each
other. With regard for deportees, for instance, the information or details about the
repatriation of the deportees was circulated only for limited agencies. Each agency also
has their own data on deportees, resulting in different statements and data about the
number and locations of the deportees. There was also a case when the information about
the repatriation was leaked by local police. Subsequently, it garnered attention from the
local media which undermined the repatriation process (Anindya, 2019, p. 234). The
repatriation process attempted to hide the identity of the deportees from the community
as the authorities feared that the local community would refuse to accept them in the
society, and it would only hinder their reintegration process into the society. Therefore,
various information related to terrorism is mostly centralized to the Detachment 88, the
police’s counterterrorism special unit. Highly sensitive information, particularly about the
top targets will not be shared for fear of a leakage of information. For instance, in 2016,
there was a series of arrests of terrorist suspects in Batam, yet the local police were only
informed about the arrest operation on the day itself.4
These cases demonstrate that the relevant agencies have invested their networks
and knowledge with their own organisational structure to collect intelligence information.
Subsequently, they attempt to ensure that the information will not be leaked, and their
operation or programmes could succeed. If sharing of information also means the leak the
information to the third parties or adversaries, they would rather withhold the information
to their own organisation. They would not want to risk their “asset” by sharing it with the
other agency.

Bureaucratic Culture
The leakage of intelligence information demonstrates the fundamental problems within
an organisation, namely the recruitment process and personnel audit. Both Indonesia and
the Philippines suffer from the deeply entrenched bureaucratic culture of the patronage
system. In the Philippines, there is a perennial problem of “Padrino System”. The Padrino
system is a patronage system in which an influential person will assist their relatives or
acquaintances to get the desired positions in an institution or agency (Gripaldo, 2005).
Within PNP, this system promotes the practice of corruption and nepotism in the
Philippines. Subsequently, underqualified persons or even criminals could pass the
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recruitment process by exploiting this system. Meanwhile in AFP, this tradition creates a
problematic recruitment process whereby the commanders tend to recruit individuals who
can be loyal to them without considering their ability to process and analyse intelligence
information (Vicentico E. Jr, 2020). The tradition creates a sense of reluctance for each
unit to share information. The AFP consists of various units, such as the Eastern
Mindanao

Command

(EASTMINCOM)

and

Western

Mindanao

Command

(WESTMINCOM). However, these units rarely share information with each other which
hampers the intelligence efforts (Vicentico E. Jr, 2020, p. 13). While the financial motives
could not be omitted from this case, there is also a sense of prestige and pride from each
unit that prevents them from sharing information (Vicentico E. Jr, 2020, p. 13). Keeping
important information for themselves will enhance their bargaining positions to the
civilian authorities (Anindya, 2020). In exchange, they will be given more strategic
positions in the policy making and implementation process.
In Indonesia, the patronage system and factionalism are nothing new. This
bureaucratic culture has been deeply ingrained since the New Order regime whereby
President Suharto attempted to ensure his regime's survival by instilling the patronage
system to the security organisations. He would only recruit people whom he believed to
be loyal to him. This culture is also associated with the culture of “Bapak-ism”. The
culture of “Bapak-ism” which can be translated as “father-ism” has been deeply ingrained
in Indonesia. In a group, there will be a “father” figure that will lead their members and
cultivate a sense of loyalty to the group which creates a strong bond among them. This
culture also defines the relationship between “Bapak (father)” or the leader and the “anak
buah ” whereby there is a degree of authority of the leader in shaping the organization's
goals and values. The implementation of this culture aims to maintain internal order and
deter the members of organizations from challenging the top leadership (Shiraishi, 1992,
p. 155). Hence, the members should behave accordingly in order to gain rewards (Pye,
1999; Irwanto, Ramsey, & Ryan, 2011). While material and strategic positions are
valuable rewards, it also increases the self-esteem of individuals (Ramakrishna, 2009).
However, we could not deny the fact that in-group bias could undermine interagency
coordination. It tends to be detrimental to intelligence gathering whereby each sharing of
information is an important feature to connect the dots between individuals and terrorist
networks. In addition, it compromises the recruitment and career advancements within
relevant intelligence agencies whereby favouritism and personal networks are preferred
instead of personal capabilities.
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CONCLUSION
This paper has set out to investigate the root causes of the problems in counterterrorism
cooperation in ASEAN. This author concludes that ASEAN Our Eyes will encounter
significant obstacles in intelligence gathering due to the inherent problem of bureaucratic
resistance. The Ministry of Defense from each country is supposed to gather intelligence
information from the relevant agencies. They are expected to pool all relevant information
about the terrorist networks in their country and stop the movements of the terrorist
suspects. However, this article shows that intelligence gathering is not an easy feat. Each
agency is hesitant to render their information to the other agency. At one point, they
believe that sharing information will only undermine the accumulated efforts in hunting
their targets. The coordination agency could not offer reassurance that sharing of
information will not lead to the leakage of critical information. Subsequently, each agency
will stick to their established working flow and resist change.
Fägersten’s bureaucratic resistance is a helpful framework to analyse the obstacles
of sharing of information between relevant agencies in a country. Although this study
uses the case of Jolo Church Bombing which only involved Indonesia and the Philippines,
the bureaucratic problems, namely the patron-clientalism, are also pertinent issues in
other Southeast Asian countries (Hlaing, 2007; Ockey, 2007; Chamber, 2020). Many
Southeast Asian countries have been struggling in reforming the governance system from
the residue of the corrupt authoritarian regime. The detrimental culture of patron-client
has permeated for decades and a macro regional solution might be insufficient in
addressing the problems. There is an urgent need to address the local and national
problems first before moving forward to the regional solutions. For instance, fixing the
underlying problems in the recruitment process that tends to recruit individuals based on
favouritism instead of merit. On one hand, this system could ensure loyalty and prevent
leakage of information from the organizations, but at the same time it also prevents the
flow of information between organizations.
AOE would be a great counterterrorism initiative to create an integrated database
on the region’s terrorist networks. However, ASEAN should also ensure that similar
integrated databases also exist in each country. AOE could not expect the Ministry of
Defence to gather comprehensive intelligence information. Not to mention, in each
country, the Ministry of Defence is not necessarily an intelligence coordination agency.
It is likely to exacerbate the overlapping responsibilities and confusions among
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intelligence institutions in a country. Instead of streamlining the reporting system, this
new established initiative will add another layer in the current system. AOE should ensure
that its system will not complicate the existing intelligence establishment in each country.
AOE should also point out what would be the benefit of supporting the initiatives for the
region. In the end, FTF is a complex phenomenon and requires solid coordination between
relevant agencies to handle it. There are strings of networks across the countries and
regions to help them to move from one place to another. Firm intelligence sharing would
help in breaking the chain and prevent them from executing their plans in carrying out
terror activities.
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Note:

Following the outbreak of Syrian Civil War, many individuals were lured by the Islamic State (IS)’
propaganda for the final apocalyptic battle in Dabiq, Syria. They aspired to emigrate to Syria to live under
the banner of the caliphate on the final day. However, emigrating to Syria is not an easy feat. There were
many aspiring jihadis who were stopped before entering Syria, mainly at the border of Turkey and Syria.
These individuals were deported back to their home countries (see Anindya, 2019).
2
Interview with an Indonesian government official from the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT),
2 March 2022.
3
It is important to note that not all aspiring jihadis are willing to emigrate to the Philippines as it does not
have solid attractions as Syria does. Syria is believed to be the final battle ground between the Islamic
Messiah, Mahdi and the false Messiah, Dajjal.
4
Interview with a police officer in Batam, December 20, 2016.
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